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Meshkin v. Kominsky, No. 249916, 2004 Mich.App. LEXIS 2770 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2004) (holding in order to properly allocate an accreted shoreline for riparian rights purposes, a trial court must draw a
line from the point where the originally platted boundary line meets
the original shoreline, as represented by the meander lines on the
original plat, to a point on the currently existing shoreline).
John Meshkin and Vicki Ten Haken (together referred to as
"Meshkin") brought suit to quiet tide to lakefront property they have
owned since 1975. The Meshkin property abutted the property of Paul
Kominsky, Sr., and Esther Coffindaffer (together referred to as
"Kominsky"). Meshkin alleged that his lot included land submerged
under water that extended beyond the shoreline. The conflict arose
due to a seawall that Kominsky constructed and allegedly extended
onto Meshkin's property. Meshkin sued Kominsky in the Allegan Circuit Court to quiet title to the land on which Kominsky's seawall extended. Kominsky counter-claimed, alleging that he had acquired tide
to the land based on adverse possession. The trial court found that
Meshkin failed to present a prima facie case that he had title to the
land in dispute and that both parties had riparian rights to the submerged land based on riparian boundary lines. These riparian boundary lines were part of a survey taken, which showed that the lake to
which the property abutted was irregular. Meshkin appealed this decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Meshkin claimed that Kominsky was not a riparian owner because a
court must make such a determination based on whether the parcel of
land was separated from the shoreline by another parcel at the time of
the original government plat, regardless of whether the water had subsequently risen to fully submerge the separating piece of land. Both
sides presented expert testimony. Meshkin's experts contended that
Komisnky's land did not touch the water, and Kominsky's experts
stated that Kominsky's property extended to the water's edge. The
trial court sided with Kominsky, and the court affirmed, finding no
clear error by the trial court.
The court also found that the survey the trial court used to determine the riparian boundary lines did not follow the appropriate case
law and was therefore incorrect. Case law mandated that a survey draw
riparian boundary lines from the meander line as established at the
time of the original government plat. In order to properly allocate an
accreted shoreline, such as the one at issue in this case, a survey must
draw a line from the point where the originally platted boundary line
met the original shoreline. The court further stated that three accepted methods of dividing ownership in a lake bed existed. If the lake
was circular, then the shoreline represented the base with the center
line being the vertex of a triangle. If the lake was four-sided or oblong,
the lines were drawn perpendicular to the median center. If neither of
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these methods could be used, authorities divided the lake bed in proportion to the shoreline owned. The shoreline described the point
where the property met the original lakeshore prior to any filling in or
rescission of the water.
Thus, the court upheld the ruling that Meshkin and Kominsky
were riparian owners, but reversed and remanded the method that the
trial court used in deciphering the riparian boundary lines.
Michael 0 'Loughlin
MINNESOTA
Dead Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Otter Tail County, No. A04-717, 2005 Minn.
App. LEXIS 123 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2005) (holding a county's inquiry into the potential adverse environmental impacts of a conditional
use permit was insufficient, thus requiring preparation of an environmental impact statement to address the potential effects of increased
recreation and groundwater nitrate levels).
Dead Lake Association ("Association") brought a claim under the
Minnesota Environmental Policy Act against Otter Tail County
("County") for failure to prepare an environmental impact statement
("EIS") prior to approving a housing development proposal and conditional use permit on Dead Lake. Dead Lake, classified by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") as a naturalenvironmental lake ("NEL"), had limited assimilation capabilities for
development and recreational impacts. Therefore, the County completed an environmental assessment worksheet ("EAW") that considered whether the potential impacts of development warranted further
inquiry in the form of an EIS. Due to the increased sensitivity of shallow NELs, both the DNR and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") recommended EIS preparation. However, the County
Planning Commission ("Commission") determined, after consideration of public input, an EIS was not necessary because reasonable mitigation techniques included in the proposal eliminated any potentially
adverse environmental impacts. After the County reviewed the Commission's decision, it ultimately declared an EIS was unnecessary and
approved the development proposal, granting the requested conditional use permit. The Association subsequently sought judicial review
in the Otter Tail County District Court.
The district court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, finding substantial evidence in the record supported the negative EIS declaration. Specifically, the district court held the County's
decision not to prepare an EIS was not arbitrary and capricious because the County considered all inherent and potential problems associated with the proposed development. The Association appealed to
the Minnesota Court of Appeals.

